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Examining Potentiality in the Philosophy of Giorgio
Agamben
Elizabeth Balskus
I. Introduction
“There is something that all people, whether they admit it or
not, know in their heart of hearts: that things could have
been different, that that would have been possible. They
could live not only without hunger and also probably
without fear, but also freely. And yet, at the same time—and
all over the world—the social apparatus has become so
hardened that what lies before them as a means of possible
fulfillment presents itself as radically impossible” –Theodor
Adorno
Following the publication of his book Homo Sacer:
Sovereign Power and Bare Life in 1995,1 Giorgio Agamben
quickly became one of the most widely discussed thinkers in
contemporary European philosophy. Although Agamben’s
academic career has spanned over three decades, the success
and relevance of the political critique found in Homo Sacer
has led most analyses of Agamben to be centered around the
significance of this book. However, attempts to view
Agamben’s philosophy through the lens of the political
theory expounded in Homo Sacer seem vastly misguided.
Agamben himself has proclaimed: “I could state the subject
of my work as an attempt to understand the meaning of the
1

Agamben, Giorgio. 1995. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare
Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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verb ‘can’ [potere]. What do I mean when I say: ‘I can, I
cannot’?”2 Agamben later explains that this questioning of
the verb potere leads him repeatedly to examine the
categories of potentiality and actuality. One can see
throughout almost all of Agamben’s writings this theme of
potentiality and a curiosity into the role potentiality plays in
all aspects of our existence. Indeed, one of the most central
and obscure chapters in Homo Sacer, “Potentiality and
Law,” focuses on the role potentiality plays in the power
structures of our systems of sovereignty. It would seem,
therefore, that before we can begin to truly understand
Agamben’s political or moral philosophy we should first
attempt to grasp this potentiality that lies at the foundation of
Agamben’s thought.
Attempting to define potentiality within Agamben’s
philosophy, however, is an exceptionally difficult task.
Leland de la Durantaye writes: “The first challenge to
understanding Agamben’s idea of potentiality stems from its
centrality”.3 Because the term potentiality is used in so
much of Agamben’s work in various different ways, it is
often easier to pinpoint its influence in a particular work,
rather than elaborate what precisely this potentiality is.
While de la Durantaye has argued (in my opinion, correctly)
that potentiality plays a large role in all of the major ideas
found in Agamben’s philosophy4, I believe that there are
three concepts within Agamben’s thought that can lead to a
richer, more precise idea of this potentiality:
inoperativeness, decreation, and profanity. In this paper, I
2

Agamben, Giorgio. 1999. Potentialities: Collected Essays in
Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 177.
3
De la Durantaye, Leland. 2009. Giorgio Agamben: A Critical
Introduction. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 4.
4
Ibid.
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plan to examine Agamben’s potentiality, beginning with
Agamben’s use of Aristotelian potentiality, through the role
it plays in inoperativeness, decreation and profanity,
showing that potentiality in Agamben’s philosophy goes far
beyond the possibility to be or not be, but also serves as the
foundation for political, creative and moral action.

II. Aristotle and Thought as Potentiality
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the shadow
‐ T.S. Eliot
No analysis of Giorgio Agamben’s potentiality can
begin without a discussion of the potentiality found in
Aristotle’s De Anima and Metaphysics. Agamben begins
almost every section of his writing on potentiality with
Aristotle and consistently states that his own views on
potentiality have their origins in Aristotle. Both Aristotle
and Agamben maintain that anything potential is capable of
not existing in actuality, and that “what is potential can both
be and not be, for the same is potential both to be and not to
be”.5 This statement initially seems to be a simple
establishment of the contingency of beings and events.
However, the relationship between the potential not to be
5

Aristotle. 1986. Metaphysics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1050 b 10.
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and reality can be seen in various ways. Aristotle writes: “A
thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is
said to be potential is realized, there will be nothing
impotential”.6 Agamben uses this definition of potentiality,
which has often been interpreted as Aristotle merely stating
that if something is not impossible then it can be called
potential, as a foundation for a much deeper meaning of
potentiality. Agamben interprets Aristotle as saying, “if a
potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality,
then there is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to
not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it
as such”.7 Agamben finds within Aristotle a “potentiality
that conserves itself and saves itself in actuality”.8 This
concept of a potentiality that maintains itself even after an
event is actualized is difficult to grasp. What exactly can
this potentiality consist of if an event has already occurred?
The potential to not be is easiest understood in an
example that both Aristotle and Agamben utilize: possessing
a faculty. Aristotle specifically writes about the faculty of
sight as an ability that always contains within it its own
potential to not be. If we were constantly in a state of being
where we could see, sight itself would not be a faculty which
we possess; it would merely be a condition of our existence.
However, we do not simply experience sight itself. We also
have the ability to experience darkness. And it is because
we can experience darkness and are aware of this sensation
as the “not-being” of seeing that we can say that we possess
the faculty of sight. This potential of sight to not be
maintains itself throughout our experiences, as we are
6

Ibid., 1047 a 24-26.
Potentialities, 183.
8
Ibid., 184.
7
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constantly aware of our potential for darkness and can
achieve this darkness at any point (for example, by shutting
our eyes). At the very core of our ability to see is our
potential for darkness, and it is indeed this potential for
darkness that allows us to see the light. De la Durantaye
aptly states that Aristotle’s emphasis on the darker side of
potentiality, the “not-to” that accompanies every ability we
possess, is significant to Agamben’s concept of potentiality
because, “it denotes the possibility for a thing not to pass
into existence and thereby remain at the level of mere—or
‘pure’—potentiality”.9 But what can this pure potentiality
possibly entail?
The idea of a pure potentiality is made clearer in
Agamben’s discussion of the intellect. Aristotle states that
nous, or the intellect, “has no other nature than that of being
potential, and before thinking it is absolutely nothing”.10
This statement leads Agamben to establish the intellect as
the perfect example of pure potentiality, a potentiality
“which in itself is nothing, [but] allows for the act of
intelligence to take place”.11 But how are we to think of this
potential of the intellect? What does it mean to examine
thought’s potential to not think? Aristotle devotes a large
section of the Metaphysics to addressing the complexity of
the potentiality of the intellect. The problem is fairly
simple: Aristotle wishes to maintain that thought is the
highest of all human faculties. It becomes difficult to make
this claim, however, if one simply views the intellect either
as thinking about objects or not thinking at all. De la
9

Critical Introduction, 5.
Aristotle. 1986. De Anima. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 429 a 21-22.
11
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Durantaye explains: “If thought were merely the sum of
things of which it has thought, not only would it be inferior
to its object, but it would also leave unexplained thought’s
most singular feature: its ability to reflect upon itself”.12 It is
in thought’s ability to think itself that Aristotle is able to
maintain the supremacy of the intellect: “thought thinks
itself, if it is the most excellent of all things, and thought is
the thinking of thinking”.13 It is in thinking itself, in
detaching itself from any outside object, that the intellect is
truly pure potentiality.
Although Aristotle has provided Agamben with an
example of pure potentiality, the relationship of this
potentiality to actuality still remains ambiguous until
Agamben explains in full the extreme significance of
thought thinking itself. Agamben writes: “The potential
intellect is not a thing. It is nothing other than the intentio
through which a thing is understood; it is not a known object
but simply a pure knowability and receptivity.14 This “pure
knowability and receptivity” of the intellect is, in fact, the
pure potentiality of the intellect. When viewed as the ability
to know or reflect, pure potentiality of the intellect becomes
extremely important. This potentiality can exist apart from
the actualization of any thought of a particular object
because it is, in fact, this potentiality itself that allows for an
object to even be thought. Therefore, the potentiality of the
intellect not only allows for thought to maintain a supreme
position ontologically, it is also the foundation of thought in
general. Furthermore, “in the potentiality that thinks itself,
action and passion coincide and the writing tablet writes by
12
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itself or, rather, writes its own passivity”.15 This idea of
“action and passion coincid[ing]” and impotentiality giving
itself up to a realized action is a theme frequented in
Agamben’s writing. For example, Agamben believes that
perfect writing does not come from the desire to write any
thing in particular, but “from an impotence that turns back
on itself and in this way comes to itself as a pure act”.16
This impotence that denies itself for the sake of
actuality is quite abstract and difficult to understand.
However, there are clear examples of the type of passion at
play in Agamben’s philosophy, most notably, in his
discussion of Glenn Gould in The Coming Community.
Agamben writes: “even though every pianist necessarily has
the potential to play and the potential to not-play, Glenn
Gould is, however, the only one who can not not-play, and,
directing his potentiality not only to the act but to his own
impotence, he plays, so to speak, with his potential to notplay”.17 This comment could refer to the notorious
reputation Glenn Gould held as one of the most technically
gifted pianists in the world, one of the most renowned
performers of the 20th century, who did not, however,
practice the piano regularly and, if he did practice, often did
so without the use of an actual piano by miming the motions
and playing the songs in his mind. While every concert
pianist has the skill to exercise his ability to play the piano,
Glenn Gould, in exercising his ability to not play the piano
by “playing” without his instrument, maintained his
impotentiality as a pianist. This impotentiality was turned
15

Agamben, Giorgio. 1993. The Coming Community. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 36.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 34.
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back towards itself the minute Gould’s fingers touched a
piano at a performance, when the skill and technique
acquired by not playing the piano allowed Gould to play
Bach better than any pianist in the world. It is this act of
impotentiality turning back on itself that is often lauded in
Agamben’s writings as the highest action possible, and it is
important to keep this concept of impotentiality giving itself
to itself as the highest act in mind when examining
Agamben’s views on ethics and politics.

III. The Inoperative
“There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes
so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take
part” – Mario Savio
Leland de la Durantaye correctly states that, “no
single term in Agamben’s writing is so easy to
misunderstand as inoperativeness”.18 When Agamben
writes in his book The Coming Community that
inoperativeness should be “the paradigm for the coming
politics”19, the reader’s initial reaction is most likely
confusion. While in English, the word inoperative has
negative connotations of being useless or non-functional, the
way in which Agamben uses the term is anything but
negative. Agamben is led to the topic of inoperativeness
through examining the question of the purpose of mankind.
Agreeing with many contemporary philosophers that, “there
18
19

Critical Introduction, 18.
Coming Community, 93.
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is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no
biological destiny that humans must enact or realize”20
Agamben establishes in a section of The Coming Community
entitled “Ethics” that, “there is in effect something that
humans are and have to be…It is the simple fact of one’s
own existence as possibility or potentiality”.21 For
Agamben, therefore, the potential nature of human existence
is the foundation of all moral and political actions.22 But
how can human potentiality translate into moral activity?
And how is this potentiality related to inoperativeness? The
potentiality to act and its relation to the inoperative becomes
clear when examining two examples Agamben frequents in
his writings: Bartleby the scrivener, and the 1989 protests at
Tiananmen Square.
Herman Melville’s short story “Bartleby the
Scrivener” details the life of Bartleby,23 a scrivener who
decides to stop writing without any expressed reason other
than his constant refrain: “I prefer not to.” While Bartleby’s
decision to cease writing (and performing most tasks of
everyday life) eventually leads to his incarceration and
death, Agamben points to Bartleby as a hopeful figure of
pure potentiality, who “exceeds will (his own and that of
20

Coming Community, 43.
Ibid.
22
It is important to note: “That ethics and politics should not be treated
as separate and distinct disciplines is one of the guiding ideas in
Agamben’s philosophy” (CI 13). Therefore, in this paper I will often use
the terms ethical and political interchangeably due to the belief I share
with Agamben that the ideal political theory is simply people living
together ethically.
21
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Melville, Herman. 2004. Great Short Works of Herman Melville.
New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
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others) at every point” and is truly able “neither to posit nor
to negate”.24 When asked to write, Bartleby, although he is
fully capable of writing, simply replies that he would prefer
not to. By becoming a scrivener who does not write,
Bartleby preserves his potentiality in its purest form.
Bartleby’s stance also directly relates to the inoperative
because Bartleby, in neither affirming nor negating the
requests of his employer when he asks Bartleby to write, has
effectively removed himself from the power structures at
play. At a very basic understanding, for Agamben, “to be
‘inoperative’, it would seem, would be to refuse to be an
operative part of the state’s machinery”.25 However, the
example of Bartleby shows a more dynamic view of the
inoperative that reaches beyond political action.
“Inoperativeness… represents something not exhausted but
inexhaustible—because it does not pass from the possible to
the actual”.26 The reason that Bartleby is so disturbing to his
employer (who is the narrator of the short story) is that, in
removing himself from the constraints of reason and, indeed,
the constraints of society as a whole, he is the paradigm of
the inoperative, of “the other side of potentiality: the
possibility that a thing might not come to pass”.27 And
because Bartleby never offers a reason for his refusal to
work and never actually denies the requests made of him,
the authorities at hand are completely bewildered as to how
to deal with the scrivener.
Bartleby is not the only example of a figure of the
inoperative utilized by Agamben. Agamben often cites the
24

Potentialities, 255, 257.
Critical Introduction, 18.
26
Ibid., 19.
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demonstrations at Tiananmen Square as an example of
political activism similar to that he envisions for the coming
politics. Agamben notes: “What was most striking about the
demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence
of determinate contents in their demands”.28 The
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square presented themselves as
“something that could not and did not want to be
represented, but that presented itself nonetheless as a
community and as a common life”.29 It is this coming
together of people without any presupposition of belonging
to a group united by a common identity that the Chinese
government found so dangerous. If the protestors had
demanded any particular goals, the government could have
found a way to defend itself and deny them, but the group of
protestors at Tiananmen Square were simply removing
themselves from the “machinery” of the Chinese
government, declaring themselves inoperative until their
situation could become bearable. Successful political action
in the future, therefore, would be to embrace one’s
potentiality and declare oneself as inoperative within the
sovereign structures of one’s society.
IV. Decreation
“Don’t play what’s there, play what’s not there.” – Miles
Davis
Potentiality in any context can easily be seen as a
creative force. In the individual’s ability to act or not act,
create or destroy, there is a level of creative potential within
28
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every person. “For [Agamben],” de la Durantaye points out,
“potentiality is indeed to be understood in the context of
creation, but seen from a strange side—one that he calls
decreation”.30 The word decreation is not a term commonly
used and therefore requires closer examination. Agamben
once defined decreation as a “threshold between doing and
not-doing”, a limit that is reached in the creative process
where the artist “no longer creates but decreates”.31 De la
Durantaye is quick to assert that this ambiguous notion of
decreation should be viewed neither as an “undoing of
creation” or a “deconstruction”.32 How, then, are we to
conceive of this strange idea of decreation?
A greater understanding of decreation can be found
in a section of Agamben’s essay, “Bartleby, or On
Contingency” called “The Experiment, or On Decreation.”
Agamben begins by recounting Leibniz’s conception of
contingency and potentiality. Leibniz states in his essay, On
Freedom, that he was “brought back from this precipice [of
fatalism] by a consideration of those possibles which neither
do exist, nor will exist, nor have existed”.33 When Leibniz
considered the problem of free will and moral responsibility,
he originally came to the conclusion that, if God created
everything and had foreknowledge of all that he created,
then everything that has existed, exists and will exist must
exist necessarily. If every action I perform must necessarily
occur, then none of my actions could have been otherwise.
And if it was completely impossible for me to have done
otherwise, blaming me for my actions by sending me to Hell
30

Critical Introduction, 22.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
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On Freedom, 106.
31
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for eternity seems, at the very least, unjust. At the very
moment the entire universe seemed devoid of any
contingency, Leibniz remembered that there are literally an
infinite number of events that could occur or actions that
could be taken in a person’s life that are never realized in
actuality but nevertheless exist as possibilities. This
consideration led Leibniz to the realization that everything
that exists in the actual universe (with the exception of the
laws logic and geometry) could have been otherwise. And it
is due to this realization that Leibniz conceived of the
principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything
that occurs happens for a reason. From the principle of
sufficient reason, Leibniz comes to the conclusion that the
universe in which we live is the best possible universe,
because God, containing perfect reason, had to have created
this universe because it was better than all of the other
possible alternatives. Leibniz’s conception of the
contingency of the universe is best articulated in the final
pages of Leibniz’s Theodicy, which he describes a chamber
containing all of the possible worlds that could have existed
instead of the actual world. The potential worlds exist in
what Leibniz describes as “an order succession of worlds,
which shall contain each and every one the case that is in
question, and shall vary its circumstances and its
consequences”34 which God sometimes examines, admiring
his decision to create the world as it is. These potential
worlds will never be actualized, but the principle of
sufficient reason necessitates the eternal existence of these
potentialities in God’s understanding. The worlds continue
to exist in God’s understanding, because if they were to

34
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171

disappear, there would be nothing to compare the actual
world to—it would simply exist.
These necessarily existing possible worlds are the
reason why Agamben draws upon Leibniz when discussing
pure potentiality and the idea of decreation. In fact, one can
easily see in the figure of Leibniz’s God the same
potentiality of Bartleby the scrivener—this ability to
maintain the potential for an event to happen and not happen
at the same time. Leibniz’s God can look at the world as it
is in actuality and also the potential for other worlds, thereby
forever maintaining the contingency of the universe, as, for
God, everything could eternally happen or not happen. This
is the reason that God returns to the “ordered succession of
worlds”—in his ability to view all of the possible worlds, he
is also, in a way, negating the actual act of creation. All
possibilities still exist within his understanding, and will
continue to exist for all eternity.
However, Agamben does find fault with Leibniz’s
conception of contingency and God asserting his freedom in
revisiting the moment prior to creation, because in returning
to the moment of decision, before the actual became
actualized, God has to “close his own ears to the incessant
lamentation…from everything that could have been
otherwise but had to be sacrificed for the present world to be
as it is”. 35 It is at this point when Agamben’s take on
potentiality differs from that of Leibniz, and this is where
Bartleby again becomes useful in our understanding of
Agamben. In never explaining himself or actually stating
“yes” or “no” to any of his employer’s demands, Bartleby
“calls into question this…supremacy of the will over

35
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potentiality”.36 And as the will, for Leibniz, is necessarily
determined by reason, Bartleby also calls into question the
supremacy of reason and asserts his potentiality as a man
without will or reason for his actions. Through his phrase “I
would prefer not to,” Bartleby challenges the principle of
sufficient reason. If the laws of reason do not apply, then
there is no legitimate justification for why this world exists
and the infinite number of potential worlds were never
actualized. This is why Agamben refers to Bartleby as a
messiah who has arrived to “save what was not”.37 Because
the laws of reason do not apply to him, Bartleby asserts the
right of those possibilities that have never and will never
exist to be actualized.
The value of Bartleby as a messiah for all of the
possibilities that are never actualized can easily be called
into question. If God, as Leibniz argues, creates this world
because it is the best, then what is the use of invoking these
potential events that were not chosen because they were
inferior? It is this inferiority of the possible worlds that
Agamben wishes to challenge. While Leibniz can argue that
God must have rationally chosen the best of all possible
worlds, Agamben is clearly using Bartleby to call into
question the supremacy of rationality as a justification for
creation. Bartleby asserts that, while this world may be the
most rational, that does not necessarily make it the best.
Rationality, which for so long has been almost synonymous
with morality within the Western philosophical tradition,
particularly in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, may, in
fact, be as arbitrary of a gauge for the merit of an action as
anything else. By championing the cause of events that have
36
37
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never and will never exist, Bartleby calls into question on a
fundamental level why things exist as they do, why the
world was not and is not otherwise.
Within the framework of Leibniz’s cosmology,
Agamben defines decreation as, “a second creation in which
God summons all his potential not to be, creating on the
basis of a point of indifference between potentiality and
impotentiality”.38 In examining this decreation, therefore,
we can see that “potentiality truly understood is not only all
that came to pass but also all that might have come to pass
and did not”.39 In every person’s life, there is at least one
moment when she asks the simple question: why? Why did
I go to Macalester College instead of University of Chicago?
Why am I studying philosophy and not music? A large
amount of our thoughts and energy are devoted to
considerations of options we did not choose and actions we
did not take. We often find ourselves wondering how we
ended up in a particular situation and what would have
happened if we had chosen a different path. Once our
decisions have been made, however, we tend to look at the
events leading up to them as necessary: I had to go to
Macalester because University of Chicago wanted me to
borrow too much money in student loans; I had to study
philosophy because I found that studying music made
performing and listening to music less pleasurable. I have to
currently be a student because if I do not get a college
degree, my odds of finding a fulfilling career are slim. This
after-the-fact necessity we apply to events is what Agamben
takes such umbrage with. What we all know and yet
constantly try to deny is that we could have acted differently
38
39
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and the current situation does not have to be as it is now. In
decreation, contingency is returned to all events, causing us
to remember that, along with the few potentialities that are
actualized, there are an infinite number of potentialities that
will never be and, yet, will continue to shape and influence
our lives.
V. Profanity
“In certain trying circumstances, urgent circumstances,
desperate circumstances, profanity furnishes a relief denied
even to prayer” – Mark Twain
In his book Profanations, Agamben attributes
Trebatius with the quote: “In the strict sense, profane is the
term for something that was once sacred or religious and is
returned to the use and property of men”.40 In looking at the
distinction between the profane, which can be utilized by
everyone, and the sacred, which traditionally belongs to the
sphere of the divine and cannot be touched by humanity,
Agamben sees great potential for appropriation of the sacred
into the profane. One way of reclaiming the sacred for the
profane that Agamben believes has been severely neglected
in contemporary life is the act of playing. “Play not only
derives from the sphere of the sacred but also in some ways
represents its overturning”.41 In taking the rituals involved
with the sacred and using them for playful purposes,
“play…drops the myth and preserves the rite”.42 By
40
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maintaining the structures of power but imbuing them with
new meaning, such as the use of religious rituals in the
children’s song and dance “Ring around the Rosy”, the act
of play is a powerful tool. In fact, Agamben states that, “to
return to play its purely profane vocation is a political
task”.43
This discussion of profanity and sacredness may
initially seem out of place when discussing modern politics.
Though the categories of the sacred and the profane may at
first seem outdated, Agamben clarifies that, although we
may no longer refer to it as the sacred, there is a “religious
sphere that assails every thing, every place, every human
activity in order to divide it from itself”.1 This sphere is the
sphere of consumption. The sacred realm of capitalism is,
according to Agamben, consumption, and capitalism in its
most pure, extreme form is concerned with making
experience unusable or unprofanable by separating our
actions from ourselves and presenting them back to us as a
spectacle, to be observed and not used. A good example of
this attempt to alienate ourselves from ourselves is
pornography: the human form is appropriated, filmed, and
then presented to us as something that can be watched but
never experienced. Agamben calls this phenomenon
“museification.” “Everything today can become a Museum,
because this term simply designates the exhibition of an
impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experiencing”.2 It is
of extreme importance, therefore, that future politics “wrest
from the apparatuses [of power]—from all apparatuses—the
possibility of use that they have captured”.3 The reclaiming
43
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of the possibility of use is, in fact, “the political task of the
coming generation”.4
We can see, therefore, that potentiality lies at the
very heart of this concept of the profane. In examining the
current structures of power and the rituals of our time, we
have the ability to find within them the possibility for new
use. Agamben uses the example of feces to illustrate this
point. While, in everyday society, feces are clearly off
limits and have only one purpose (that is, to be expelled and
then removed) Agamben notes that babies, almost
instinctually, like to play with feces, to explore their
different uses, until society intervenes and they are
conditioned not to. While Agamben does not advocate the
widespread movement to promote creative use of feces, his
point in invoking such an extreme example is clear: there is
the possibility for new use of the objects that surround us.
We simply have to recognize these objects’ potential for a
different purpose than the one they have traditionally held.
This potential for new use is the only way to combat
capitalism’s attempt to make experience unusable. To return
to the example of pornography, Agamben notes that while
pornography has alienated our own bodily form and
sexuality from ourselves, there is potential to negate this
effect by engaging with the figures at hand. He cites the
example of a pornographic star who, instead of simulating
the pleasure associated with the sexual acts in which she is
engaged, simply looks, as though bored, at the camera and,
in a sense, watches the viewer watching her.5 In this act of
looking at the camera, the fantasy world of the pornographic
is shattered; you are no longer watching a torrid affair, but
4

5
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rather, are distinctly aware of the unreality of the situation
being enacted on screen. While this development in
pornography has not yet been explored in its fullest capacity,
Agamben believes that the potential is there to reclaim the
body’s sexuality and reengage with our own experience.
And indeed, this potential for profanity extends far beyond
the realm of pornography. We must simply be willing to
look at our world through the eyes of an infant and allow
ourselves to glimpse the possibility for new use in
everything around us.

VI. Conclusion
“The absolute desperate state of affairs in the society in
which I live fills me with hope”
- Giorgio Agamben
In a chapter of his book The Coming Community
entitled “The Irreparable” Giorgio Agamben describes the
world after the final, biblical Judgment Day as, “just as it is,
irreparably, but precisely this will be its novelty”.6
Consistent throughout Agamben’s political writings is the
idea that today’s society, in all of its injustice and atrocity,
contains within it the means to transform itself into a more
just, desirable world. This idea that from the depths of
despair we can grab the tools to transform ourselves is not
novel to Agamben—Marx’s quote from The Communist
Manifesto, “The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled
6

Coming Community, 39.

178

feudalism to the ground are now turned against the
bourgeoisie itself” expresses the same sentiment. This
theme is repeated again in The Coming Community’s
chapter, “Halos”, in which Agamben characterizes life after
the coming of the messiah, saying, “everything will be as it
is now, just a little different”.7 This slight difference, the
“halo…added to perfection”8 is “a zone in which possibility
and reality, potentiality and actuality, become
indistinguishable”.9
This halo, this recognition of the contingency of our
situation, is more attainable than it would at first appear. As
Agamben has pointed out, we already possess the means; the
key is potentiality. Going far beyond the classical definition
of potentiality as the ability of something to be or not be,
potentiality becomes, for Agamben, the most significant
truth of our existence and the only basis for a coming
politics not rife with destruction. We can see in Agamben’s
conception of the inoperative the call to, like Bartleby,
embrace our impotentiality and, instead of demanding
specific changes, declare that we will not participate in the
modes of sovereignty at play in today’s society. We see in
the concept of decreation the want to restore to all events
their initial contingency or potentiality, to realize that things
did not have to and do not have to be the way they are. To,
according to a quote from Benjamin that Agamben himself
employs, restore “possibility to the past, making what
happened incomplete and completing what never was”.10
And we see in the profane the need to grasp what is already
at hand and play with it.
7
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9
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This hope for change in the face of darkness explains
why Agamben, despite the fact that his analysis of the
current political situation is dire (some have even said
apocalyptic), is often surprised when he is characterized as
being pessimistic. Yes, we live in an era with the extreme
potential for catastrophe. But, indeed, this potential for
despair is always also the potential for hope—this is the
beauty of potentiality. What Agamben hopes to accomplish
with the potentialization of society is the reexamination of
what we believe is truly possible and impossible. In viewing
the world and its events as truly contingent, it becomes clear
that we cannot and should not wait for the messiah, some
future event that will liberate us, or a divine revelation,
because, after all, “the life that begins on earth after the last
day is simply human life”.11
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